Has anything changed since all this was written? It is very disturbing!

RAN ACROSS THE FOLLOWING ELSEWHERE ON THE INTERNET AND IT IS OH SOOOOO TRUE!!!!!

Corporate Conservation: Conservation International

Corporate Conservation In Developing Countries: The Monster Corporate Conservation In Developing Countries: The Monster Is
Hungry Again
By Corporate Insider
[Reprint freely without permission]

In today’s world, certain large conservation organizations, mostly based in the United States, have come to be run just like corporations. Over the years, they’ve expanded beyond their country of origin to become truly multinational in scope, with
offices in many developing countries. Putting those two facts together, it’s entirely appropriate to call them multinational conservation corporations. Run by corporate conservationist types, they’ve created a model that bears intense scrutiny. I hope my words can help open a few more blinds and let light shine
into what is becoming a very dark house.

Only minor differences in philosophy exist behind how corporate conservationists think compared to the mindset of traditional corporate leaders. The CEO conservationists act as any corporate CEO would. They may substitute the term “get more donor money” for the more traditional “make more profits” corporate line, but the underlying intents are virtually indistinguishable. “Conservation” is treated at high level meetings as would any company’s marketable product, bantered about like trademarks such as “Big Mac” or “Vanilla Coke”.

Securing more donor money is little different in process from the traditional corporate drive to increase profits. The recent fiduciary rating that an NGO sought from Swiss-based RCP & Partners to boost its attractiveness for donor investments is yet
another reflection of this now-dominant corporate mindset.

Whether it be more company profits or new conservation donations, the same basic corporate strategy is being applied. In the context of a conservation corporation, more donations are important in growing the organization and capturing a greater market share of the conservation pie. That in turn, provides
expanded opportunities to tap into more donors’ pockets. Take a look at how major donors to conservation give money these days for work in developing countries and you will find that local
NGOs get little in comparison to the heaps lavished on the conservation multinationals. “Developing countries” and “endangered wildlife” are analogous to fancy gizmos and gadgets on new cars. Of course they have a function, but what has become more important is their ability to add to the marketability of
the product and increase profits.

Companies selling the same product always jostle for the limited market share, and in the corporate conservation world the McCormicks, Seligmanns, and Fullers (Let’s throw in Sandelow to round out the list) smile at each other in public and backstab
behind the scenes, just like the Gates, McNeelys, Ellisons, and Cases in the more traditional corporate environment. For many CEOs, the biggest thrill lays in the success of the hunt. Will they make the big kill? And so it is for the conservation barons: Will they secure the multimillion dollar grant and deny
it to their arch rivals? Anyone who doubts that this is the way these high level minds function must find and speak to someone who knows the characters personally.

Attracting donor money is important, but to what greater extent are the multinational conservationists still concerned about the core bottom line of conservation? Even though you’ll see a lot of conservation imagery in corporate headquarters, you won’t smell much real conservation. Washington walls bedecked with rainforest products on the walls give way to tropical hardwood conference tables and stunningly impressive 2nd floor reception areas mainly because conservation today is more about symbolism
than reality. Not any kind of symbolism, but the kind that may tickle the fancy of those prepared to open mighty big pocketbooks. This is not a game to be played by those walking the earth and trudging its trails.

The inner sanctums of these Conservation Incorporateds is to real conservation much like the Pirates of the Caribbean ride at Disneyland would be to the country of Jamaica. In other words, there’s little comparison, relationship, or even connection between what the corporate conservationists are doing and planning in Washington, and what might really work out in the
field. Yet the grand plans and schemes hatched in those hallowed beltway nests end up being implemented by unfortunates out in the field, again and again.

Perhaps the conservation tycoons have so little sense of the reality of conservation on the ground because that is not their world and never has been. It is still fair to criticize them severely for how their perceptions are creating mega-disasters on the ground that exceed the mega diversity hotspots on their maps.
They may believe, deep in their hearts, that they’re doing good, but the fallacy in those thoughts lies in the fact that their greatest motivation is not so much the protection of a lemur as in securing the largest prize ever in the grand hunt for the big donor. The conservationist barons tell the world that if they
can only bring down that big game this will be a win for conservation. In return, not only does a blind world continue to open their pockets to contribute to the next round, they actually think things are starting to turn in favor of the world. They’re
sadly mistaken for only dreams are being bought and sold in this candy store.

Any company’s merchandise is promoted on the basis of strengths. It’s no different with the product we now call Conservation. The multinational conservation companies understand this reality. In their ever-more-sexy campaigns, literature, and pitches to
prospective donors, the Conservation product is promoted on its “feel good” value. Because saving animals and forests make donors feel good, the multinationals play this to the hilt, the
bigger the animal and more extensive the forest to be protected, the better. So long as donors get a big shot of “feel good” drug through their veins from their contribution, probably we should
relent and agree that all donations were well spent. After all, the product did what it was supposed to do, and the pleased donors will probably come back for another hit of this “feel good” morphine. The Conservation product is a knockout. The only possible distraction is that it’s not real conservation.

Bigger is better has become the battle cry amongst the
conservation CEOs even though all reports from the field suggest that starting small is the better strategy for success. The barons will not accept the latter because it means small projects which require small organizations, modest donations and middle
class directors. Instead, they have admirably masked the paradox by essentially stating that the big plan will work because it involves lots of small projects, but doing them everywhere! If Conservation Incorporated could show us which of their small-scale strategies have worked well and could be replicated
across cultures and environments, their words might make sense. We still await that evidence.

Big animals get big attention and big money for conservation. Yet, the loss of an estimated 50% of the world’s orangutan population over the past decade has come despite so many years of such intense conservation focus by the mega-organizations, and is
a statistic that sorrowfully says it all: Mega-conservation corporations carrying out projects in developing countries are a mega-failure. Of course, their public relations embellishments, and frequent use of the term “future challenges” in proposals
will continue to obscure the patently obvious. Most of what looks like a success on the ground only appears that way because it’s being propped up by the constant presence of the corporation. Perhaps someone should teach them what the word sustainable means.

Let’s reflect again how we arrived at this sorry state of affairs. I believe it started when the conservation barons passionately embraced and applied corporate models to their organizations. Surely they were smart enough to realize that they were using a model that has, after all, such principal goals as profits and growth, not welfare and humanity. Yet, somehow
and some way, the tycoons still felt the model would work.

I’ve often wondered if they knew beforehand or it came as a surprise to find that they were not constrained by many aspects of the model that hamstring traditional corporations. For example, the multinational conservation corps can largely operate
outside legislation that mandates a measure of corporate responsibility on traditional companies. Today’s big conservation CEO’s can play the field much like New Age cowboys in a Wild, Wild West. They’re fairly free to do as they please, with no one reining them in should they break standards of decency. They don’t actually have to deliver real-life quality
conservation in return for donations. Delivering a perception of doing good is good enough. They’re free to abandon any community they’ve failed with or disrupted and never be liable for damages.
They never get indicted for false advertising either, and despite enormous consultancy fees and obscene overheads, they are never accused of exploiting the people of developing countries. Let’s also not forget that they often don’t pay taxes to developing countries. That sometimes includes sales and even
payroll tax.

So many attractions to run a conservation NGO like a corporation, while holding up the nonprofit banner the moment anyone questions the obvious. The potential of the corporate model to generating gobs of money still must have been the biggest drawing card to the conservation barons when they adopted the corporate model. Being in charge of a conservation company that rakes in tens if not hundreds of millions of tax free dollars every year must bring a heady dose of ecstasy to these CEOs. Was it the sugar plums dancing in Seligmann’s head that overwhelmed any thought of
evaluating the flip side of what happens when you apply the corporate model to achieve real conservation? We’ll never know. Whatever the reason, there is little indication that the conservation barons evaluated the corporate model objectively
enough to try identifying, much less mitigating its inherent weaknesses when the model is applied to achieve conservation objectives.

To avoid me being judged as anti-corporation at this point, let me state upfront: Certain aspects of the traditional corporate model are fantastic. By all means, follow corporate rules of accountability and to a point, continue to promote greater efficiency and productivity within the organization. Accountability and efficiency are universal hallmarks of good
management and reinforce our desire to never waste monies given to conservation.

Applying the traditional corporate model has brought far more than these benefits to conservation. If you sense any big pressure to increase efficiency and productivity within the conservation corporations today, look further and you’ll probably see that the underlying motivation is to formulate a better, more
convincing illusion of conservation rather than in improving tangible conservation outcomes. Flashy presentations, beautiful pictures and touching stories of conservation that have little basis in reality, have become increasingly common for the very reason that they fit so nicely into an overall smoke and mirrors strategy to increase the “feel good” effects of the Conservation product. It scarcely matters whether the conservation project is succeeding on the ground. If you think I’m waxing cynical, consider for a moment what it’s like to work at a Conservation
Incorporated headquarters. How, in such an environment, could you possibly be encouraged to what’s going on in the field as much as much as you would be pressured to package the results more
effectively? These priorities, as pathetic as they might appear, naturally flow out of such a structure. Lessons from the field, as authentic and genuine as they are (if for no reason, because they actually come from the field) have their greatest value as yet another window dressing for Conservation Incorporated. Holding up such documents for the world to see,
makes it look as if things are not only great but getting better all the time. There is no need to actually follow such documents, or even train staff in their lessons. You’ll be hard put to find copies of “best practice” analyses in field offices, much less see their contents practiced by field staff broadly
within the organization.

The moment a donor plunks down a dollar to these behemoths, much is automatically redirected to overhead and the likely conservation kick reduced to a gentle nudge. Consider the inherent structure of these organizations. Even money spent on country offices can be evaluated as largely unproductive overhead, when you compare that use of funds against what might
have happened if those same dollars were spent more directly to target conservation. What those overhead monies support is gloriously presented the moment you walk to and into any Conservation Incorporated headquarters. The waste from that exceeds any possible savings that could come from fine-tuning or more rigorous adherence to Gantt charts, or mandating that field workers return the few cents they can’t produce receipts for. In fact, any attempt to cut some of this corporate conservation fat seems to result in nothing more than increased time in the office and less in the field for each conservation dollar. It would be difficult for any General Motors executive to use the word “lean and mean” to describe his company without eliciting snickers. Yet, conservation CEOs can say the same thing with a straight face and get nothing but applause. We need to stop clapping and begin to laugh uproariously they next time they make such farcical statements.

Years ago, there was mild hoopla over how little of people’s donations to conservation actually went to support on the ground activities. The obscene overheads of these conservation corporations has been oft noted. The mystery is why people accept such waste and throw more into the pit, because they are not so quiet when the same inefficiencies are noted in
government.

The constant exploitation of good, caring, and genuine staff out in the field by the conservation barons is probably the most wretched aspect of the corporate conservation model. Today’s emphasis on large-scale implementation, with plans and goals generated mostly in Washington, almost guarantees that any publicized success in the field will have been spin doctored.
However, a few local initiatives do well despite all odds, and we can credit that to people totally different in character and purpose to what sits on top of the heap. The CEOs scan the horizon for these atypicals, and when found, they’re not emulated
as much as they’re dangled before prospective donors. The do-gooders are rarely aware of the exploitative nature of this exercise, whose main intent is, as always, to bring in more money. The CEOs tell any do gooders who doth protest to leave the PR work to the big guys, and they’ll have all the money they
need to do their thing out in the field. The fallacy of this argument is that the attitudes and perceptions of the conservation CEOs dirties everything underneath, and money or not, good people are often forced into trying to implement unworkable, often totally artificial processes in the field.

Collectively, I’ve painted a rather large and gloomy cloud, but it is very bit as stormy and threatening as I’ve described. Rather than spending a huge amount of time searching for a silver lining (the managers of the oversized mega-projects are experts in that), maybe it’s time to do the unthinkable and consider some radical notions.

First, maybe the traditional corporate model is incapable of achieving meaningful conservation results on a local level in developing countries regardless of how much it is adapted or re-tooled. Might it also be that the model of soft money-dependency will never be workable on such a large scale? Those two aspects of today’s multinational conservation corporations seem to be most responsible for creating the monster we see today.

The corporate model is undeniably successful in aspects related to consumerism, profiteering, and overall economic expansion. The soft money model, for its part, seems effective on a small scale in bringing a high level of accountability. Both models are well proven, but when they’ve been applied to conservation,
the result has been disastrous.

Each time the corporate model to conservation, we get the same tired result: Conservation moves from being a noble process and turns into a gauche but marketable trinket, packaged (not created) in different ways for different audiences. In reaching that pitiable state, conservation as we know it today has not only amassed a huge market for itself, it has simultaneously
managed to push aside the weaker competition, undermining many genuine efforts that try to stick to the point and do real conservation. Like the hapless inventor who invented the perfect light bulb that never burned out but no one bought, those who think only about doing conservation right are rarely noticed
above the din of conservation marketeers cast in the P. T. Barnum mold.

Applying the pressure of soft money on the giant scale assumed by today’s conservation corporations seems to make worse the kind of favored CEO personality - one who is infatuated and completely subservient to the goal of creating ever more sexy projects that can attract ever more money and land even more donors, all
designed to keep the coins consistently rolling, rolling in. CI and TNC have been achievers par excellence of those money making goals. Yet, whenever you see how these corporations apply the dribble down of these donations to the Third World, and you
witness with horror how effectively this corporate attitude towards conservation either attracts the wrong people to conservation work or rubs off and sullies the potentially excellent ones, you cry.

The weaknesses glare with the growing evidence that the corporate model simply doesn’t work to truthfully achieve better use of resources and the environment in developing countries. Perhaps because they believe their own hype, the corporate conservation mindset remains unmoved. Discovering the Next Big Thing to
attract donors is the rage. Mega this and mammoth that is getting worse, not better, and starting to cover the developing world like a cancer, simultaneously eating away at the spiritual fabric of what conservation should be all about, as well as the most
basic reason for the existence of NGOs.

It’s long overdue that these conservation corporations should be held accountable to whether or not they’re actually achieving conservation in developing countries. Thus far, their approach is too often superficial if not ludicrous. How Conservation
Incorporated operates in developing countries matches the “NGO approach” just about as well as it achieves “real conservation.” It is high time to pass international legislation to make these
conservation companies show more corporate responsibility, and the first step should be to ban them from using the word “NGO” to describe themselves. They are no more and no less a “nongovernment” organization than is Walmart, Microsoft, or the
Vatican. The difference is that Bill Gates would never call his company an NGO, and the reason why he wouldn’t is because he shows more corporate ethics than these conservation barons of the early 21st Century.

Real NGOs are different. They hold up the “people before profits” mantra as being more important than raising money. Although none are flawless, so long as they don’t get into the bigger is better syndrome, they are more likely to practice what they preach, assisted by less pressure to package and market what
they do. The best NGOs commit themselves to constantly measure themselves against that ideal and try to get as close to it as they can. Unlike the conservation multinationals, they actually have a chance of success.

In contrast, the new tendency of conservation multinational corporations is to get in bed with non-conservation corps(witness WWF’s partnership with ChevronTexaco). My, my, how far the distance they’ve traveled away from their core principals. But it doesn’t matter: today’s conservation corporations sit in the catbird seat. They can get away with far more than any oil company, because from moment they began, they vehemently rejected profit as being at the core of their company and established themselves as a different kind of corporation. Not only that,
they used the right touchy feely words from the outset. Of course we’re all beginning to realize that it takes far fewer factories and much less energy to garner millions in donations than to make and sell gasoline to get the same cash. Exxon-Mobil
must look upon all this with great jealousy, since recasting itself as a conservation corporation is well neigh impossible. ChevronTexaco and Royal Dutch Shell have made the attempt and to some degree succeeded in creating a kindler, gentler image, sometimes directly assisted by the conservation multinationals.
We all understand, deep down, that people working for oil companies are not evil incarnates. But no matter how hard we try, do we really believe the messages we hear on television and advertisements that imply that workers spend more daily hours on activities related to people than on profits?

Of course we don’t believe it, because companies don’t exist for the purpose of pampering people and we never thought they should. They’re here to make money and they say so upfront. So why are we so quick to confront Chevron’s hype, yet so readily ignore CI’s, TNC’s and WWF’s equally absurd hard sell of how much
they’re achieving in Third World conservation with their mega hotspots and endangered spaces?

Maybe what we’re seeing here is nothing more than the today’s phase of corporate evolution. Conservation Incorporated may represent the New Big Thing in corporate recasting. Admittedly, the model is brilliant, because conservation multinationals have
effectively been able to escape accountability, pull the wool over people’s eyes on whether they’re achieving what they say is their bottom line, all the while creating and successfully marketing a product that brings back legions of satisfied customers. Traditional corporations can only dream of such
vantages.

Let’s go back to the ChevronTexacos, the Royal Dutch Shells, and the ExxonMobils in this discussion and say something good the way traditional companies are changing. In recent years, many such companies have identified, then exploited definite, indirect
linkages between profit-making and people-caring to achieve a better level of human welfare concurrent with their efforts towards greater profits. In other words, corporations have come to see it in their interest to pay more attention to safety and
environmental concerns, because it helps the profit line in the long-run and it’s good for people too. What they say is most certainly a positive contribution to humankind and the result is
a win-win situation. A coffee processor buying only rainforest tree shaded coffee from Latin America instead of coffee grown in less environmentally friendly conditions is to be applauded. An
oil company that doesn’t fill in a local marsh is worth commending.

But the key word here is “indirect” when we talk about linkages between work traditional companies do and what human benefit is achieved from that work. An indirect linkage is quite different from a direct kind where you work with the direct goal and intent
of improving human welfare. Direct linkages between
profit-driven activity and improved human welfare are
conspicuously absent in even the best of companies. That’s not a criticism at all, because the principal intention of corporations is to make money. To their credit, many have done they can to fine-tune the framework, identify indirect linkages, and utilize them as best they can to achieve good deeds.

Sadly we cannot lavish the same praise on the conservation corporations. The problem with applying the corporate model to NGOs is that NGOs were never supposed to help people in an indirect fashion. Human welfare, whether it involves better health, stronger education, or sustainable use of natural resources, is supposed to lie at the very core of the ideal NGO
we envision. These aren’t side benefits that come from NGO staff work, nor something to be achieved by contributing part of the NGO’s income to good causes. Direct links are at the heart of what NGOs are all about.

Multinational conservation companies such as The Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, and World Wildlife Fund tout the importance of such direct linkages, but they long ago left that world. They don’t operate like NGOs and will never again be NGOs, as much as they might preen themselves otherwise.
They have wholeheartedly adopted a corporate model that inherently will pressure their workers to put the greatest effort into promoting a product, while continuing to improve that product (trademark name: Conservation) - but only enough to keep the consumer (in this case, the donors) satisfied. Whenever
conservation is pursued within a corporate framework,
conservation planning will always be superceded by an even stronger drive to sell conservation as more attractive merchandise. Improving its substance will be of secondary consideration.

At best, these conservation multinational corporations will strengthen the indirect linkages inherent within their structures. Since Conservation Incorporated has become nearly rabid about helping traditional corporations develop their own indirect linkages, this might seem like an effective role for them in the future, and it doesn’t take hundreds of millions of
dollars to carry out that work effectively. But it’s still a problem and once again Conservation Incorporated is mucking it up. The first big problem is by finding ways to make forest clearance activities such as oil palm more environmentally friendly, they are directly promoting greater forest clearance.
There is still more than enough underfunded efforts to protect ancient forests in the world to not even bother with mitigating forest clearance activities.

At the end of the day, indirect linkages won’t swing it in saving the endangered spaces of this world for another reason: this does not effectively strengthen the philosophical underpinning of what caused conservation NGOs to appear in the world to begin
with. Conservation is supposed to be all about people who care, regardless of their ethnic or cultural origins. Sustainable conservation outcomes come via a strong backup of genuine and deep conviction, passion and sincerity. Conservation corporations and their mega-projects seem light years removed from all that. Their activities by and large pay little attention to the development of long term relationships that
enable those people qualities to develop on a large enough scale to make a difference.

The conservation tycoons won’t be a tad bothered by any of this radical talk and complaining, so long as the donor dollars keep flowing and the product keeps selling. Maybe it’s good or maybe not, but their smiles may disappear if my predictions come true.
I have gazed into my crystal ball and I see the multinational conservation corps heading towards an infamous crevice, the very abyss that General Motors Corporation tripped into nearly a half century ago with their scandalously unsafe Corvair car. Some of
my colleagues disagree, saying that they’re more likely to end up as the next Enron. Let me explain my hypothesis first.

Multinational conservation companies point with pride to the conservation results they say they’ve achieved in developing countries, but their bully pulpit is becoming as fundamentally unstable as the Corvair itself. In both cases, a product is being repeatedly and deceptively advertised. The conservation deception has already been the subject of a number of books and
articles over the past decade, although no author who has vied to become the next Ralph Nader has yet been elected in that role by the public. Why has it been so challenging to awaken the world to the shoddy merchandise being pushed by these conservation
corporations? Why does WWF and its kin have such Teflon coatings? Could it be that the conservation whistleblowers are dealing with a far more unworried or ignorant consumer (i.e., the donors who contribute so much money to these conservation corporations) than Ralph Nader confronted when he was reaching out to educate the American consumer? What else could explain so much deafness in so many donor ears?

Still, I think the day of reckoning draws ever nearer and it behooves us to keep hammering the point. Real conservation is not being achieved in developing countries by these multinational conservation corporations. Furthermore, there is little indication that the corporate model they employ will ever work.
Let’s ask the donors again: Is “real conservation” really what they want to see achieved with their money? Or must we see even more evidence to support the jaded view - that donors are happy enough getting that “feel good” kick through their veins each time they sign a new check?

At the end of the day, it’s the donors’ money and they’re free to do what they want with their millions. If they’re happy and content buying an effective Conservation product, then we should at least compliment them for having become a rare satisfied
shopper in today’s planet of disgruntled consumers. But like the retort the exasperated mother gave the teenager who kept arguing why fast food is healthy, can we at least request that the donors stop their pretence for a moment and be honest with themselves if
not with us, about what they’re doing and why? What is the gut reason for continuing to contribute to these multinational conservation corporations? What do they hope to get out of all that money shoveled into those oversize conservation mouths?

All these realizations became apparent to me over time, after many years working with one of today’s multinational conservation corporations. My association began when it was a relative mom and pop store in the NGO vein. As the small store grew into a
mall and then became an industrial park, anyone who entered the door with idealism and faith could only bear to stay in the room by learning to hear, see and speak no evil. It is either that or painfully face the hypocrisy that has come to characterize the institutions that so many tirelessly gave their best for.

If newcomers face this dilemma, they’ll be able to leave before they’ve made such a big investment of their lives. Most newcomers into these organizations however won’t be fazed and the reason is because corporate structures tend to attract corporate
types, who take one look at “conservation” and immediately contemplate its market potential. This is a different breed than the old folks, but then again the old folks had to leave or burn out. Conservation, Inc. today makes an effort to ensure that they only get the right incomers. They’ve also learned the
basics of indoctrination, sometimes promoting their corporate conservation in near-Moonie fashion so that everyone will march in lock step to the corporate anthem.

May a few more people in the inner corporate sanctums wake up and critically examine the kinds of structures they’re supporting! The stories I hear again and again of conservation project failures in developing countries is of no surprise, given who you’re dealing with and where their principal concern rests.

Don’t blame the developing countries, their cultures, their attitudes, or their people for these failures. The culpability actually lies in the inane pursuit of a corporate model to achieve conservation in developing countries whenever local people are involved. It hasn’t worked. It won’t work. Please stop supporting such insanity.

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Prince Bernhard and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
To attract donors, large and small, as well as media attention, Nicholson, Scott and the founding fathers of WWF wanted the royal family to lend their name. They approached Prince Philip to be president. Philip was an avid outdoorsman and hunter - in January 1961 he had bagged a Bengal tiger in India - and he and Queen Elizabeth had been to Kenya, on a safari best remembered because King George VI died while they were watching wild animals and Princess Elizabeth had become Queen. Scott sent Philip a draft of the proposed charter. Philip read it carefully, replying that one provision was 'unctuous,' and another 'to wordy.' This careful reading was not what Scott hold expected. It is 'a great bore that he suggests so much alteration,' Scott wrote Nicholson. The founding fathers had wanted the Prince only as a figurehead. Philip agreed to head up the British chapter of WWF, but he turned down the presidency of the International and suggested his friend Prince Bernhard for the post. The men were alike in many ways. Both had been born into European royal families, but not very distinguished ones, and had acquired their status and string of titles when they married - Bernhard to the future Queen Juliana of the Netherlands. The two men were handsome, dashing, and staunchly conservative politically.
Scott, who liked consorting with royalty, made the pitch. 'Prince Philip (who was sailing with me at Cowes in the 12 metre 'sceptre' on Saturday) . . . told me that he was very keen that you should 'head-up' the international Trustees,' Scott wrote to Bernhard. 'Please may I ask Your Royal Highness to say that you will be President of the Trustees of The World Wildlife Fund.'' Prince Bernhard he eventually said yes, and he served as president until 1976, when he was forced to resign after it became public that he had solicited more than a million dollars in 'commissions' from Lockheed in exchange for Lockheed's receiving contracts to build warplanes for the Netherlands. (At one point after the scandal broke, Bernhard said that he had intended to give the money from Lockheed to WWF; a member of the board at the time insists this is not true.
Bernhard remained active behind the scenes in WWF, but a couple of years after he resigned, Philip became president of the International, and though it was thought he would serve for only a few years, he is still in power. The Prince is a committed conservationist and he undoubtedly has given prestige and visibility to WWF around the world. At the same time, however, many in the Third World have questioned whether he is the right person to head an organisation that does most of its work in developing countries. At a meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of state, most of them from the Third World and black, Philip said to an aide, 'You wouldn't think the peace of the world rested on this lot, would you'?' on another occasion, he referred to the Chinese as 'slitty-eyed.'
WWF WAS SET UP to raise money, but in spite of the initial successes, it did not prove very effective. Nicholson had said that $1.5 million each year would be needed for conservation, which Scott thought he could easily raise; indeed, he anticipated coaxing $25 million from the rich. Scott discovered that socializing with the elite was one thing, getting them to part with their money quite another, and it was several years before the total of WWF's revenues reached $1 million.
WWF's financial fortunes began to change dramatically after a hard-driving South African businessman, Anton Rupert, joined the board. An Afrikaaner from the Cape, Rupert had already made millions as the owner of Rothmans International tobacco company, the foundation of the Rembrandt Group, his wholly owned business empire. When Rupert expanded beyond South Africa, he bought Dunhill and Cartier, and eventually he became one of the richest men in South Africa, rivalled only by Harry Oppenheimer, the gold and diamond industrialist. Rupert had long been interested in conservation, including the restoration of historic buildings, and in 1968 he joined the WWF board of trustees; he stayed on the board for twenty-two years, ill spite of a provision in the organisation's original incorporation documents that limited members to two three-year terms, a provision that was routinely ignored for the benefit of several other influential members of the board as well. Rupert brought a considerable amount of his own money to WWF, but, more important, he conceived a plan that would raise millions
Rupert's idea was the '1001 Club' The 'one' was Prince Bernhard The other one thousand were wealthy individuals who could be persuaded to part with $10,000. The one-time donation brings lifetime membership, and the names of the generous patrons are kept secret by the organisation. According to these secret lists, American givers have included August A Busch, Jr, of the beer company; Henry Ford II; Peter Grace; Nelson Bunker Hunt, the silver trader; Mrs Geoffrey Kent, of Abercrombie & Kent; Robert S. McNamara; Cyril Magnin; Lew Wasserman, of MCA; Thomas Watson, of IBM. Many of the donors understandably wish to remain anonymous (in part to avoid being badgered by other charities), but it is also understandable why WWF does not want the list made public. It has included many less savoury individuals - Zaire's President Mobutu, Sese Seko, one of the most corrupt leaders in Africa; Daniel K Ludwig, the reclusive American billionaire, whose companies destroyed thousands of miles of the Amazon rain forest; Agha Hasan Abedi, the founder of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCC1); Robert Vesco, the financier who fled the United States in the 1970s to escape trial on charges of fraud, embezzlement and obstruction of justice; Tibor Rosenbaum, founder of a Swiss bank that laundered billions of dollars of organised crime money and who was accused of embezzling Israeli deposits in the bank; Thomas Jones, who was forced out as chief executive of Northrop after it was revealed that the company paid $30 million in bribes to government officials and agents around the world in exchange for contracts; Lord Kagan, a British businessman convicted of theft and conspiracy to defraud the British tax service; a Norwegian shipowner convicted of taking a £1 million bribe; an individual who was the conduit for the money from Lockheed to Prince Bernhard.
There has been another remarkable feature about the 1001 Club - the number of South Africans. On the 1989 list, at least sixty individuals were from South Africa, including seven of Rupert's relatives. Many were also members of the Broederbond, the secret, conservative Afrikaaner society that has traditionally wielded immense political power in South Africa. Only five countries had more donors, and as a percentage of their population, South African whites had three hundred times as many members as the United States. It is easy to understand why so many South Africans have been willing to part with $10,000 to Join the 1001 and not all of it has to do with conservation. Not many international clubs welcomed white South Africans, and membership in the 1001 provided them an opportunity to mingle and do business with tycoons, as well as with Prince Philip and Prince Bernhard. What else they may have gained from the membership is unknown, in part because so much of what WWF-lnternational does is kept from the public and even from the organisation's own trustees. Because of the secrecy and closed nature of the WWF club, it is also difficult to know the extent of the influence that so much South African money has had on the organisation's conservation work. There can be little doubt, however, that WWF-International's initial opposition to the ivory ban reflected South African power on the board - South Africa was adamantly opposed to the ban, because its elephants were not being poached and it made money from selling ivory.
One place where South Africa's clout has been felt is in the office of the director-general, the man who runs WWF. Since 1977 that man has been Charles de Haes. Much of de Haes's past is vague, which seems to be by design: he has chosen to reveal very little about his background and some of what the organisation does say publicly about him is at odds with the facts. On WWF's public list of officers and trustees, de Haes is identified as being from Belgium, and he was born there, in 1938. But as a young boy, he moved with his family to South Africa. After graduating from Cape Town University with a law degree, he got a job with Rothmans International, Rupert's tobacco company. De Haes's Official resume - that is, the one WWF distributes - makes a point of noting that he went to work for the tobacco company 'although himself a nonsmoker.' It then says de Haes 'helped establish companies' in Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. What it does not say is that these were companies that sold cigarettes. Maybe de Haes didn't smoke, but he made money by encouraging others to do so.
De Haes was brought to WWF through the back door by Anton Rupert in 1971. He was first assigned to be personal assistant to Prince Bernhard. One of his tasks was to implement the 1001 Club project. He was tremendously successful. Ten thousand dollars was worth even more back then, yet it took de Haes only three years to find one thousand donors. Prince Bernhard provided the letters of introduction, but de Haes was the salesman who clinched the deals. Even de Haes's fiercest critics - and they are many - use the word 'brilliant' when describing his fund-raising skills.
In 1975, with the backing of Rupert and Prince Philip de Haes was named joint director-general of WWF, and two years later he had the top position to himself. De Haes had no education or experience in conservation, other than his few years at WWF, yet he was now in charge of the most prestigious and influential conservation organisation in the world. It was a position that would have appealed to the most qualified and eminent individuals in the field, yet no effort was made to recruit any of them.
WWF may have taken on someone without conservation experience, but then, it cost the organisation nothing: Rupert agreed to pay de Haes's salary - which, according to a British trustee, goes far in explaining why de Haes got the Job. WWF never said at the time that Rupert was paying de Haes, and it still tries to conceal this fact. The organisation's chief spokesman, Robert SanGeorge, stated emphatically during an interview in 1991 that de Haes had not been seconded from Rothmans to Prince Bernhard and WWF during the early years. But an internal WWF memorandum signed by the organisation's executive vice-president in 1975 talks specifically about 'Mr. de Haes's period of secondment to WWF.' What this means, of course, is that de Haes was still employed by a South African corporation while working for WWF. 'I thought it was a scandal,' says a former board member from North America, Who added that it was only by accident that he learned that Rupert was paying de Haes. This board member did not like the arrangement. 'Who does the director general serve'? Is the interest of a South African tobacco company synonymous with the world conservation movement? Even more troubling to this director was the fact that it was kept a secret. 'lf it was such a good thing, why weren't they willing to say so in the annual report?'
In a similar vein, the organisation treats as a state secret the question of who paid de Haes after he became director-general. It was 'an anonymous donor' SanGeorge says. Even board members have been in the dark. When on occasion one asked, he was told that the donor wished to remain anonymous.
It is unlikely that any other charitable organisation that depends on public support operates with such little accountability and in such secrecy as WWF has under de Haes. It is easier to penetrate the CIA. And when WWF has been caught in embarrassing conducts it has engaged in damage control and cover-ups of the kind that might be expected from a company whose products have caused injury to consumers and the environment. Under rules de Haes promulgated, WWF employees are prohibited from talking to anyone outside the organization about anything except what the organisation has already made public; the obligation to secrecy binds the employee even after he or she has left WWF. Few are willing to break this code of silence - given their fear of de Haes and, in the case of current employees, the generous salaries and pleasant living conditions in Switzerland.
It may well be, as one senior WWF officer put it somewhat defensively, that a dollar given to WWF is still a dollar well spent for conservation. But, as this person added, 'imagine what the organisation could be with better leadership.'
Over the years there has been increasing dissatisfaction with de Haes's leadership. One of the most serious challenges to his rule came in the early 1980s, when the heads of the WWF organisations in Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland began to discuss among themselves changes they thought were necessary in the organisation. These organisations should be able to effect change because they provide most of the funds for the International - WWF-UK alone contributes nearly one-third of the International's budget, and Switzerland and the Netherlands rank second and third. The way WWF was set up, two-thirds of the money raised by the national organisations goes to the International, while one third remains with the national organisation. The 'dissident' leaders of the three national organisations objected to this because there was no accountability over how the International spent the money. They also did not like the fact that the WWF-International board of trustees doesn't represent the national organisations. The board is a self-selected body - that is, those on the board decide whom to place on it - and the national organisations, even though they give the money, have no right of representation. In short, the heads of the British, Dutch and Swiss organisations felt that too much power was concentrated in Gland - the Swiss town where WWF-lnternational's headquarters is located - and that the local organisations should have more autonomy.
Sir Arthur Norman, the head of WWF-UK at the time, was particularly disturbed by the manner in which WWF-International set up chapters in other countries. He thought they should 'be triggered off by local people, local enthusiasm, and not by someone in Bland saying 'it's time'.
extract from a web site
Bilderberg Conferences (http://www.bilderberg.org/bernhard.htm)
Prince Bernhard - personal background and his part in starting the Bilderberg Conferences
This site campaigns for general press access to Bilderberg venues - and a declaration from the organisers that the discussions are public, not private
The Prince and the Nazis - Extract from 'H. R. H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands; an authorized biography' Harrap, 1962. by Alden Hatch
U.S./Nazi connections - Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler - Bernhard's employer, I.G.Farben, is discussed
1975 - The Lockheed Scandal - The Grease Machine Exposed - extract from David Boulton's book: 'The Lockheed Papers'
At The Hand Of Man - The White Man's Game - Extract from Raymond Bonner's book on Bernhard's World Wildlife Fund
Project CA-35 - Recent research into Nazi-Bilderberg connections in Boston, Mass.
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